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Cinco de Noviembre
TIGHT ROPE
WITH MODESTO P. SA-ONOY |
If there were no documentary sources it would be understandable for us to imagine or speculate on historical events or narrate or present an event for dramatic purposes. I had been misled on several instances by early write-ups about the Negros revolution but continuing research clear questions.
There are many documentary and eye-witness records of the events that surround the Negros revolution of 1898 and for us to ignore these sources by presenting a fictional one is a disservice to our people.
A publication from the Capitol says “It was in this ‘Cinco de Noviembre’ when the marching revolutionists, led by Gen. Juan Araneta from Bago and Gen. Aniceto Lacson from Silay were actually carrying fake arms consisting of rifles carved out of nipa stalks and cannons of bamboo mats painted black”. Never mind the syntax but let’s get the facts right.
Araneta and Lacson were not carrying fake arms, they had their revolvers and only the foot “soldiers” from Bago had those “fake” arms. Some of those from Talisay were armed with pistols and Mauser rifles while most carried machetes or espading used in cane harvesting. One must recall that when the babaylanes were raiding the haciendas the Spanish government allowed the hacenderos to purchase firearms for protection in the hacienda. They naturally carried these guns during the revolt as also shown during the siege in Himamaylan.
The troops of Lacson were from Talisay, not Silay. In fact while Lacson’s revolutionaries were marching towards Matab-ang, the forces in Silay were cordoning the Spanish garrison in that town. A group from Silay under Nicolas Golez moved in to join Lacson only after the Spanish garrison there surrendered in the afternoon of November 5.
In the morning the Silay revolutionaries gave the Spaniards time to listen to the plea of Silay’s parish priest, Recollect Fr. Eulogio Saez to consider an honorable surrender. By the time Golez marched to join Lacson the latter was already in Mandalagan and had already engaged in a firefight with the Spanish contingent trying to hold them there and prevent their movement to Bacolod.
It was the forces of Lacson from Talisay that the telegraph repairman spotted in Matab-ang. None was from Silay, in fact part of the Silay revolutionaries were left behind to guard the Silay wharf and beach because of the expected reinforcement from the Spanish garrison in Iloilo.
The same Capitol publication says that the Negrosanons rose in revolt in a “bloodless revolt”. This sounds wonderful but what are the facts?
In Matab-ang, 25 casadores and 16 civil guards under Lt. Francisco de Castro blocked the force under Lacson but despite the blockade Lacson’s men continued to move forward and the Spaniards fired on them. A brief exchange of fire ensued. De Castro was hit on the head while two of his men were killed outright and several wounded that had to be carried by Red Cross ambulances to the town where the sight of blood and death caused panic.
The Capitol publication also states “Col. Isidro de Castro looking afar using a hazy telescope from atop the San Sebastian belfry surrendered upon seeing a large formation of soldiers, heavily armed with rifles and cannons.” This means that De Castro surrendered on November 5.
I had been intrigued by this claim about going up the church belfry because there were articles about this and in fact I was so misled. But after perusing the photographs taken from the church belfry and going up there I realized that the situation of the time precluded this from happening. The Lupit Bridge where Araneta’s forces encamped for the night could not be seen from the belfry because it was late in the afternoon and the line of sight from the belfry was covered with coconut trees – the area was a coconut grove. That the Araneta forces had dummy cannons is admitted by eyewitnesses but that De Castro surrender supposedly on November 5 due to these dummy guns is incorrect.
The exchange of telegrams between De Castro and General Diego de los Rios in Iloilo shows that the decision of De Castro to surrender was dictated by reality. The telegram of Rios of Nov. 6 posted at 12:30 p.m. asked for more information followed by another saying Rios will send the gun boat “Mariveles” and that De Castro should hold on. De Castro, later interviewed in Spain claimed he did not receive the second telegram and that at 12:15 p.m. he had reported to Rios that the whole province had revolted including his own casadores. He had decided to surrender just before noon of November 6.
When he received the second telegram he could no longer back out because he gave his word for an honorable surrender and the act of capitulation was already being drafted for signing at 3:30 p.m.
Were the Spaniards bluffed by the dummy guns and cannons? Could be, but the Spaniards saw the dummy guns and rifles, the bluff, on November 5 only when Araneta’s troops paraded at the plaza.*
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