NPA, plus and minus

Last week there were two news reports coming from the same military command in Negros, though issued by different officers of the same brigade.

The first was dismaying but closer to a real assessment; the other was the usual optimistic evaluation of the state of insurgency. These kinds of news have become so common they become more incredible by the day and disproven by events. 

We civilians thus get confused as to the real situation and, without a certain level of certainty programs and actions and reactions, cannot be effectively accepted by the people.

Colonel Jon Aying, deputy commander of the 303rd Infantry Brigade told the Occidental Negros Sangguniang Panlalawigan February 15 that the “strength of the NPA rose by 200 per cent during the last 10 years, from 75 armed men to 241 in the first quarter last year. The NPA has an estimated 150 firearms.

He attributed the increase to the decrease in the presence of the army in Negros during the period 2002-2008. There were only two battalions then, now the brigade has five.

I recall that while the army top brasses were talking about the decline in the number of the NPA in Negros they, at the same time, revealed the increase in the number of troops to be deployed in the island. This again shows how the AFP is not telling us the right information. I wrote then that the deployment of more troops here means only one thing – the NPA strength has gone up but the AFP insists on telling us the NPA are almost licked.

Remember how many division and brigade commanders had declared that by this and that month the NPA would be a nightmare of the past? Perhaps the army should review their press releases and come clean if they want the local governments and the people to believe them.

On the other hand, the situation in Negros and the image that Colonel Aying was trying to project was demolished two days later. On February 15 the news media reported the statement of Capt. Leo Christopher Cunanan, 303rd Infantry Brigade Public Affairs Officer saying that “the drastic reduction of the New People’s Army capability to carry out tactical offensives against government forces in Negros Occidental in 2011” was due to the effective anti-insurgency campaign last year.

The reason for this enthusiasm is that in 2011 the NPA launched only eight violent activities compared to 28 in 2010 and that he considers the NPA activities as insignificant because it involved “indiscriminate firing of weapons.”

Now here is the wallop, which is really, really significant. The captain said that the NPA strength had been “drastically reduced from 305 in 2010 to only 249 last year.

Will the military reconcile their statistics? Are they looking at a different set of data or are they presenting them to suit a particular audience? These conflicting data only erodes credibility which is already tarnished by a series of claims by top commanders that never happened. Were these statistics intended merely to present the commanders in a good light for promotion purposes?

If one reads the report of Cunanan closely his conclusions are off the mark. If indeed the reduction of the NPA strength was due to the army operations and armed engagements (23 he said) and only three were killed and 44 allegedly surrendered, how come the scores do not tally?

The fact is that these data are all estimates, resulting from what they called sightings and military intelligence reports because surely the NPA is not submitting to the military their annual roster of troops.

I can understand the estimates but the estimates should at least be reconciled by spokespersons because the army is asking for help and people will help if they know the score. As it stands, how can the local governments, especially the provincial government plan on conflicting estimates made by the same office? It is not also clear whether the NPA strength is for the entire province or only on the occidental side.

Precise information is necessary for any plan, the reason that the military undertakes intelligence operations to get the right data. “Know your enemy” is a gospel guide in military operations so that they will not operate blindly but here we have the brigade officers telling us different sets of data and thus we draw varied responses.

Colonel Aying telegraphs the idea that more troops means less NPA and his briefing indicates the army needs help. On the other hand, Cunanan is saying the NPA is on the brink of defeat because of military operations and surrenders (we heard that several times) and thus he projects the image of the brigade capable of doing what it is doing right now.

There is some logic in this conflict – Aying is asking for help; Cunanan is doing public relations.*

back to top